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Crafting Military Commissions Post-Hamdan:
The Military Commissions Act of 2006
DOUGLAS A. HASS*
In June 2006, the Supreme Court invalidatedPresident Bush's military commission
rules in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld. The Court held that the military commissions fell
outside of the military court system established by Congress, and ruled the
commissions unconstitutional as applied to both citizens and non-citizens. Congress
responded with the Military Commissions Act of2006 ("the Act"), new legislation to
establish military commissions. The Actfails to balance properly the Court'sfairness
requirements with the extraordinary demands placed on the laws of war by terrorism.
This Note summarizes whether terrorist attacks implicate the laws of war, what
protections are due parties detained in the War on Terror, and concludes that only the
laws applicable to non-international armed conflicts govern Al Qaeda 's attacks. After
examining Justice Kennedy's safe harbor in his Hamdan concurrence, the Note
considers the procedures of the Military Commissions Act of 2006. In light of the
Court's decision in Hamdan, as well as the provisions of the Geneva Conventions that
it incorporates, the Military Commissions Act fails to uphold the fairness standards
expressed by the Court. The Act would require significant revisions before it could
withstand constitutional scrutiny, even in wartime.
INTRODUCTION
On September 11, 2001, Al Qaeda terrorists attacked the United States killing
nearly 3,000 innocent civilians. The death toll surpassed the previous largest loss of
life due to a single terrorist attack, the Beslan school massacre in North Ossetia.' Al
Qaeda had attacked the United States several times over the previous decade and
claimed responsibility for the September 11 attacks.2 Following the attacks, the United
States commenced several military and legal actions against terrorist groups, including
Al Qaeda as the most prominent group. Among many orders and procedural changes,
the administration of President George W. Bush issued a military order claiming that
the executive branch could detain "enemy combatants" for the duration of hostilities.
3
* J.D. Candidate, 2008, Indiana University School of Law-Bloomington. Special thanks
to the University of Auckland Faculty of Law, Professor Kevin Jon Heller, and Dean Rosemary
Tobin for providing the author with a unique opportunity and the necessary accommodations to
write this paper. Any errors and oversights are solely attributable to the author.
1. NATIONAL COMMISSION ON TERRORIST ATrACKs UPON THE UNITED STATES, THE 9/11
CoMMISsIoN REPORT 311 (2004) [hereinafter 9/11 COMMIssION REPORT]. See J.F.O. McAllister
& Paul Quinn-Judge, Defenseless Targets, T1MEEUROPE MAGAZINE, Sept. 5, 2004,
http://www.time.com/time/europe/html/040913/story.html. In the Beslan school massacre,
Chechen rebels killed nearly 350 hostages. Id.
2. 9/11 CoMMISSIoN REPORT, supra note 1, at 59-61 (listing previous attacks by Al Qaeda
in Somalia in 1992 and 1993, the World Trade Center in 1993, Saudi Arabia in 1995 and 1996,
and the U.S.S. Cole in 2000).
3. Military Order, Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain Non-Citizens in the War
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Based on the administration's guidance, the Department of Defense subsequently
issued its own order specifying the procedures that the military would use to try these
enemy combatants before military commissions.4
In June 2006, the Supreme Court invalidated these military commission rules in
Hamdan v. Rumsfeld.5 The Court held that the military commissions fell outside of the
"integrated system of military courts and review procedures" established by Congress
and ruled the commissions unconstitutional as applied to both citizens and non-
citizens.6 Congress responded with the Military Commissions Act of 2006, new
legislation to establish military commissions. Despite the extraordinary demands
placed on the laws of war by terrorism, the Act fails to address the fairness
requirements the Court reasserted in Hamdan. The Act structured military commissions
so that a single authority with a stake in the outcome controls virtually every key aspect
of the process.
This Note argues that, in light of the Court's decision in Hamdan and the provisions
of the Geneva Conventions, the Military Commissions Act, as currently enacted, does
not withstand constitutional scrutiny, even in wartime. Part I summarizes and analyzes
the Hamdan decision. Part II examines whether terrorist attacks implicate the laws of
war. Using Al Qaeda as an example, Part III concludes that only the laws applicable to
non-international armed conflicts govern terrorist attacks. Part III also outlines the
level and type of protections due parties detained by the United States incident to the
War on Terror. Here, the Note disagrees with the International Committee of the Red
Cross and finds that the Geneva Conventions and the later Additional Protocols
support the Bush administration's classification of War on Terror detainees as unlawful
combatants. Part IV briefly outlines the military tribunal structure that preceded
Hamdan and acted as a foundation for Bush's Military Order. Finally, in Part V, the
Note evaluates the procedures of the Military Commissions Act of 2006 in light of
Hamdan and the safe harbor for military commissions outlined by both Justice
Kennedy and the Hamdan majority.
I. SUMMARIZING HAMDAN
The Hamdan decision recited a complicated litany of arcane questions of domestic
law, customary international law, Geneva Convention interpretations, the Uniform
Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), and jurisdiction. A four-Justice plurality signed the
entire opinion written by Justice Stevens.7 Justice Kennedy joined the plurality to
create a five to three majority in all but Part V and a small part of Part VI of the
opinion.8 Justice Kennedy did not agree with the plurality on the question of applying
Against Terrorism, 66 Fed. Reg. 57,833 (Nov. 13, 2001) [hereinafter Military Order].
4. Department of Defense Commission Order No. 1 (Mar. 21, 2002) available at
http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Mar2002/d20020321 ord.pdf (last visited Feb. 24, 2006).
5. 126 S. Ct. 2749 (2006).
6. Id. at 2770 (quoting Schlesinger v. Councilman, 420 U.S.738,758 (1975)). This Note
examines only non-citizen combatants as defined by the Military Order.
7. Id. at 2759.
8. Id. at 2775, 2797. Specifically, Justice Kennedy did not join the majority for Part VI-d-
iv. Id. at 2797. That Part, along with Part V, applied the Geneva Conventions directly to military
commissions rather than filtering the requirements through the UCMJ. Id. Justice Roberts did
not participate in Hamdan, having heard the case as ajudge on the D.C. Circuit Court prior to
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Common Article three of the Geneva Conventions to the case, seeing no reason to
decide the question. 9 Justice Stevens's opinion addressed three key issues that also
affect the Military Commissions Act. The first two issues involved the laws of war.
Justice Stevens outlined the framework of acceptable tribunals under the Uniform Code
of Military Justice (UCMJ), and applied what the plurality viewed as overlapping
Geneva Conventions requirements. Finally, Justice Stevens provided a basic legislative
safe harbor for the President and Congress that Justice Kennedy refined further in his
concurrence.
First, the Court held that Congress must set the parameters for any military
commissions, 10 barring an "emergency [that] prevents consultation."' 1 The Court drew
parallels to its line of separation-of-powers cases, specifically Exparte Milligan12 and
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer.' 3 In Milligan, the Court pointed to the
Constitution's distinction between the conduct of war and prosecution for war offenses.
While the President acts as Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces, Congress retains
the power to "make Rules concerning Captures on Land and Water." 14 Given this
separation, the Court in Milligan rejected the position that the President could
"institute tribunals for the trial and punishment of offences" except in "cases of
controlling necessity."'
15
The Hamdan Court noted that its earlier decisions found Congressional
authorization for the use of military tribunals, but only within the "limitations that
Congress has, in proper exercise of its own war powers, placed on [the President's
powers]."' 6 Congress did not specifically address the issue of military tribunals in its
authorization for military action after September 11,17 nor in its later Detainee
Treatment Act of 2005 (DTA).'8
The Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF) provided the President with
the ability:
to use all necessary and appropriate force against those nations, organizations, or
persons he determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist
attacks that occurred on September 11,2001 ... in order to prevent any future acts
of international terrorism against the United States by such nations, organizations
or persons.' 9
his elevation to the Supreme Court. Id. at 2758-59.
9. Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2749.
10. Id. at 2770.
11. Id. at 2799 (Breyer, J., concurring).
12. 71 U.S. 2 (1866).
13. 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
14. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 11.
15. Milligan, 71 U.S. at 139-40.
16. Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2774 n.23 (citing Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 637 (Jackson, J.,
concurring)).
17. See Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF), Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat.
224 (2001).
18. See Pub. L. No. 109-148, §§ 1001-06, 119 Stat. 2739 (2005) (to be codified at 10
U.S.C. § 801 and 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000dd to 2000dd-1).
19. AUMF, 115 Stat. at 224.
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Reviewing the AUMF in an earlier detainee decision, the Court held that the
authorization included the right of the President to convene lawful military
commissions.2 °
The DTA required the Secretary of Defense to submit procedures for Combatant
Status Review Tribunals (CSRT) to Congress within six months, and outlined other
general procedures.2 1 Congress provided numerous details about the review system,
including evidentiary rules, scopes of review, limitations on appeals, and more. Like
the AUMF, the DTA did not authorize the President to convene tribunals that differed
from those authorized by the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ). As the Court
noted, the DTA did nothing other than to acknowledge the tribunals' existence.
22
Having found no specific Congressional authority or guidance in either the AUMF
or the DTA, the Court looked to existing laws governing military tribunals, specifically
the UCMJ. 23 Previously, the Court had required that the "use of military commissions
[comply] not only with the American common law of war, but also with the rest of the
UCMJ itself, insofar as applicable, and with the 'rules and precepts of the law of
nations.' including the Geneva Conventions.
24
To find support for ruling the tribunals unconstitutional, the Hamdan Court seized
on the language of Article 36 of the UCMJ. At first glance, the Article allows the
President to promulgate "[p]retrial, trial, and post-trial procedures" that "so far as he
considers practicable, apply the principles of law and the rules of evidence generally
recognized" in United States courts.25 However, the end of the first subsection and the
entire second subsection qualify the President's power, requiring that any regulations
"be uniform insofar as practicable." 26 The majority's opinion found that Military
Commission Order No. 1, which established the actual military tribunal procedures for
alien detainees, imposed requirements that differed from the UCMJ. The Court
interpreted Article 26(b) of the UCMJ as requiring a sufficient showing that
practicality dictated departure from the normal UCMJ standards referenced in that
Article.27 The Court then found that the government had failed to offer a sufficient
basis for departing from the UCMJ's uniformity requirement. The majority cast doubt
that the military commissions would face any actual difficulties in following the
UCMJ's evidentiary procedures, or its provisions for impartial judges.28 Accepting the
Government's logistical contentions and showing deference to the President's
determination that civilian court policies were impracticable, the Court rejected the
nebulous "danger posed by international terrorism" as ajustifiable reason for departing
20. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 518 (2004) ("[T]he capture, detention, and trial of
unlawful combatants, by 'universal agreement and practice,' are 'important incident[s] of war."'
(quoting Exparte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 28 (1942))).
21. § 1005, l19Stat at2740.
22. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749, 2775 (2006) ("The DTA obviously
'recognize[s]' the existence of the Guantanamo Bay commissions in the weakest sense....").
23. 10 U.S.C. §§ 801-950 (2000).
24. Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2786 (quoting Quirin, 317 U.S. at 28).
25. 10 U.S.C. § 836(a) (2000).
26. 10 U.S.C. § 836(b) (2000).
27. Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2791 (finding that "the 'practicability' determination the
President has made is insufficient" to justify departing from UCMJ procedures).
28. Id.
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from the UCMJ procedures. 29 The Court found that the UCMJ provided the only
specific guidance, rejecting the government's contention that the AUMF or DTA could
implicitly do so. Since the Bush administration presented no support for a departure
other than the threat of terrorism, the Court rejected the President's authority to create
the tribunals under the UCMJ.
Later in the opinion, the majority expanded this analysis further. While Justice
Kennedy objected to applying the Geneva Conventions' Common Article 3 directly to
the Hamdan case, he joined the rest of Justice Stevens's Part VI of the opinion. The
remainder of this Part VI applied the Common Article 3 guarantees to the conflict
through existing provisions of the UCMJ. 30 The Court identified three different
situations where the United States had used military tribunals in the past. The third
situation, those commissions "convened as an incident to war" described in the Court's
decision in Quirin, applied to the Hamdan case. 31 The facility at Guantanamo Bay and
Hamdan's detention did not fit either of the other two models cited by the Court.
32
Although the Court doubted some of the government's charges against Hamdan,
Part VI of the opinion ultimately considered how to apply Common Article 3 to the
"War on Terror" (i.e., armed conflict with Al Qaeda and other terrorist groups).
Returning to its World War II-era detention cases, Ex parte Quirin33 and In re
Yamashita,34 the Court noted that the UCMJ not only required compliance with
American common and statutory law, but also with the "rules and precepts of the law
of nations.., including, inter alia, the four Geneva Conventions signed in 1949. "35
Like the UCMJ, Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions acts as a further
restraint on the President's ability to create military commissions.
To tie the restraints provided by Common Article 3 to the UCMJ, the Court
overturned the finding by the D.C. Circuit Court that the conflict with Al Qaeda did not
fall under the Article's "conflict not of an international character." The Court disagreed
with the assertion that courts should read the term "international character" narrowly
without regard for its context. The majority instead opted for its own literal
interpretation, observing that "international" merely referred to conflicts between
sovereigns, and that "a non-international armed conflict is distinct from an international
armed conflict because of the legal status of the entities opposing each other."3 6 While
the commentaries to the Geneva Conventions suggest the drafters intended the non-
29. Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2792. Justice Thomas criticized this broad interpretation, arguing
that Article 36(b)'s uniformity requirement either only applied to "uniformity across the separate
branches of the armed services" or did not apply because the UCMJ recognizes that "different
tribunals will be constituted in different manners and employ different procedures." Hamdan,
126 S. Ct. at 2842 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
30. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
31. Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2776 (internal citation omitted).
32. Id. The Court cited military commissions in times of martial law and in occupied enemy
territory where no civilian government operated as the other two inapplicable situations.
33. 317 U.S. 1, 28 (1942).
34. 327 U.S. 1, 20-21 (1946).
35. Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2786 (quoting Quirin, 317 U.S. at 28) (italics in original).
36. Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2796 (citing CLAUDE PILLOUD ET AL., COMMENTARY ON THE
ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS OF 8 JUNE 1977 TO THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF 12 AUGUST 1949, at
1351 (1987)).
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international conflicts category to protect the rights of domestic rebel groups in a
conflict with a sovereign government,37 other portions of the commentaries suggest
"that the scope of the Article must be as wide as possible." 38 The Court supported this
interpretation by citing cases from the International Court of Justice39 and the
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY). °
Having established that Common Article 3 applied to the Al Qaeda conflict, and
that the UCMJ incorporated the Geneva Conventions as a whole as a part of the "laws
of war," the Court held that the military commissions established by Commission
Order No. 1 violated Common Article 3's basic protections. Since the tribunals
violated the UCMJ, they could not meet the requirement in Common Article 3 that the
government try Hamdan in a "regularly constituted court affording all the judicial
guarantees which are recognized as indispensable by civilized peoples." 41 Under the
Court's interpretation of the UCMJ, the military commissions were not "regularly
constituted" because of the deviations from the procedural protections in the UCMJ.
II. DOES COMMON ARTICLE 3 APPLY DIRECTLY TO THE WAR ON TERROR?
The Hamdan Court split on the question of whether Common Article 3 applied to
the conflict with Al Qaeda and other facets of the War on Terror. Justice Kennedy did
not join the plurality in this portion of the decision, leaving an open question of how-
or whether-to apply Common Article 3. Specifically, the Court failed to resolve
clearly the status of the War on Terror in light of the Geneva Conventions' definition
of "armed conflict." By only applying the Conventions through the UCMJ, the Court
also allowed Congress and the President an opportunity to revise the UCMJ in an
attempt to decouple the Conventions entirely.
42
Certain questions about the application of the Geneva Conventions have simple
answers though. Common Article 2 provides that "the present Convention shall apply
to all cases of declared war or of any other armed conflict which may arise between
two or more of the High Contracting Parties." 43 Under the Geneva Conventions, Al
Qaeda's September 11 attacks did not create an "international armed conflict" since Al
Qaeda did not represent Afghanistan or any other High Contracting Party or other
recognized international group.44 Common Article 3, as the Hamdan Court noted,
37. Id. (citing 3 COMMENTARY ON THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF 12 AUGUST 1949, at 36-37
(Jean de Preux, ed., 1960)).
38. Id.
39. Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, 114 (June 27)
(Common Article 3 "constitute[s] a minimum yardstick" of protection in all international and
non-international conflicts, and not just armed conflicts.).
40. Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1, Decision on the Defense Motion for
Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, 102 (Oct. 2, 1995) ("[W]ith respect to the minimum
rules in Common Article 3, the character of the conflict is irrelevant.").
41. Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War art. 3, Aug. 12, 1949,
6 U.S.T. 3316, 3320 [hereinafter Third Convention].
42. See infra Part V.B (discussing the Military Commissions Act's attempted decoupling
from the UCMJ).
43. Third Convention, supra note 41, art. 2, 1, 6 U.S.T. at 3318.
44. Derek Jinks, September 11 and the Laws of War, 28 YALE J. INT'L L. 1, 12 (2003).
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applies to "armed conflicts not of an international character" and "regulate[s] conflicts
between states and sub-state armed groups" regardless of state boundaries. 45 Given its
intended broad application," courts face difficulties in defining the point at which a
disturbance reaches the point of an "armed conflict" under Common Article 3.
The drafters of the Geneva Conventions never defined armed conflict, likely a
product of the desire to encourage as broad an application of the Conventions as
possible. The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) commentary
nonetheless highlights several "convenient criteria" used to establish the existence of
an armed conflict:
47
1. That the Party in revolt against the de jure Government possesses an
organized military force, an authority responsible for its acts, acting within a
determinate territory and having the means of respecting and ensuring respect
for the Convention.
2. That the legal Government is obliged to have recourse to the regular military
forces against insurgents organized as military and in possession of a part of
the national territory.
3. (a) That the de jure Government has recognized the insurgents as
belligerents; or
(b) That it has claimed for itself the rights of a belligerent; or
(c) That it has accorded the insurgents recognition as belligerents for the
purposes only of the present Convention; or
(d) That the dispute has been admitted to the agenda of the Security Council
or the General Assembly of the United Nations as being a threat to
international peace, a breach of the peace, or an act of aggression.
4. (a) That the insurgents have an organization purporting to have the
characteristics of a State.
(b) That the insurgent civil authority exercises de facto authority over
persons within a determinate portion of the national territory.
(c) That the armed forces act under the direction of an organized authority
and are prepared to observe the ordinary laws of war.
(d) That the insurgent civil authority agrees to be bound by the provisions
of the Convention. 48
While these criteria provide better guidance than the term "armed conflict" itself,
they still fall short of an actual definition.49 Difficult cases-such as the conflict with
Al Qaeda-that do not apply seamlessly to the criteria present significant definitional
challenges. Unlike an insurgent rebel group, such as the Kurds in Saddam Hussein-
controlled Iraq for example, Al Qaeda does not control any United States territory. The
terrorist group does not challenge the authority of the United States over domestic or
45. Id. at21-22.
46. See supra text accompanying note 38.
47. 4 COMMENTARY ON THE GENEVA CONVENIONS OF 12 AUGUST 1949, at 35 (Oscar Uhler
& Henri Cousier eds., 1958) [hereinafter 4 COMMENTARY].
48. Id. at 35-36 (emphasis omitted).
49. Professor Jinks notes that the Commentary also "offers no methodology to guide the
systematic application of these factors," most notably any ranking of the criteria. Jinks, supra
note 44, at 30.
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international territory.50 Since Al Qaeda meets none of these conditions, the conflict
does not meet the traditional definition of a war of national liberation.
51
Without a clear-cut definition, other considerations govern whether the War on
Terror qualifies as an armed conflict for purposes of Common Article 3. Two sets of
these considerations provide the clearest classification guidance: "(1) the intensity of
the violence; and (2) the capacity and willingness of the parties to carry out sustained,
coordinated hostilities." 52 Additionally, the United States government's perception of
the conflict bears on the definition as well.53 Based on the government's own
statements, the United States interprets the situation as an armed conflict. Because the
government interprets the situation as an armed conflict, Common Article 3 will apply
to the situation as an "armed conflict" irrespective of the intensity of the violence or
ability of the parties to sustain hostilities. 54 As discussed below, the United States terms
the situation with Al Qaeda and other loosely affiliated terrorist groups as the "War on
Terror." The term is not empty rhetoric.55 The comprehensive military operations in
Afghanistan and Iraq, and increased military and intelligence efforts worldwide, lend
further support to the government's verbal characterization. Given the U.S. approach to
the hostilities, the War on Terror should qualify as an "armed conflict" under
international humanitarian law and Common Article 3. As an armed conflict, the
Conventions' protections of combatants and non-combatants should apply, at least in
some form.
III. Do "WAR ON TERROR" DETAINEES QUALIFY AS PRISONERS OF WAR?
Salim Hamdan contended "Article 5 of the Third Geneva Convention requires that
if there be 'any doubt' whether he is entitled to prisoner-of-war protections, he must be
afforded those protections until his status is determined by a 'competent tribunal."'
56
The Supreme Court, however, treated the question of Hamdan's potential status as
moot given their holding that the military tribunal was unconstitutional. 7 Absent
50. Arguably, Al Qaeda's calls for the destruction of the United States and its government
could meet this standard. See Full Text: bin Laden's "Letter to America ", THE OBSERVER, Nov.
24, 2002, http://observer.guardian.co.uk/intemational/story/0,,845724,00.html.
51. See HEATHER A. WILSON, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE BY NATIONAL
LIBERATION MOVEMENTS 23-24 (1988) (discussing the characteristics of wars of national
liberation and governing international law).
52. Jinks, supra note 44, at 31.
53. Id. at 32 ("Cases of internal strife constitute 'armed conflict' within the meaning of
international humanitarian law if. . . the state party to the hostilities interprets them as an
'armed conflict' (a subjective standard).").
54. The converse is not true, however. If the government does not view the situation as an
armed conflict, the other considerations apply in determining the situation's status under the
Conventions.
55. Although not an issue here, the statements alone could conceivably qualify as
establishing a refutable presumption that the government views the situation as an armed
conflict.
56. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749,2795 n.61 (2006) (citing Third Convention, art.
4, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 3324).
57. Id.
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guidance from courts, the Bush administration, the ICRC, and other organizations have
put forward competing interpretations of the Conventions.
The 1949 Third Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War
defines prisoners of war as:
[P]ersons belonging to one of the following categories, who have fallen into the
power of the enemy:
(1) Members of the armed forces of a Party to the conflict as well as members of
militias or volunteer corps forming part of such armed forces.
(2) Members of other militias and members of other volunteer corps, including
those of organized resistance movements, belonging to a Party to the conflict
and operating in or outside their own territory, even if this territory is
occupied, provided that such militias or volunteer corps, including such
organized resistance movements, fulfill the following conditions:
(a) that of being commanded by a person responsible for his subordinates;
(b) that of having a fixed distinctive sign recognizable at a distance;
(c) that of carrying arms openly;
(d) that of conducting their operations in accordance with the laws and
customs of war.. 58
The Third Geneva Convention applies Prisoner of War (POW) protections to
groups of combatants found on the field of battle. However, these POW protections
only apply in "cases of declared war or any other armed conflict that may arise
between two or more of the High Contracting Parties" that signed and ratified the
accords.59 The Convention also binds the parties to the terms of the Convention in any
60
conflict with a "Power," provided the Power accepts and applies the Convention.
Although the United States is a High Contracting Party,6' Al Qaeda is not. Like other
terrorist groups, and unlike the former ruling groups like the Taliban, Al Qaeda does
not fit the definition of a "Power." Not only has Al Qaeda never accepted or applied
the Convention, but the Convention's drafters never intended the term "Power" to
apply to such groups. The drafters intended "the obligation to recognize . . . the
Convention be applied to the non-contracting adverse State.,
62
The Fourth Geneva Convention provides civilians with protections similar to the
Third Convention's protections for POWs.63 Unsurprisingly, the Fourth Convention
58. Third Convention, supra note 41, art. 4, 6 U.S.T. at 3320.
59. Id., art. 2, 6 U.S.T. at 3318.
60. Id. ("Although one of the Powers in conflict may not be a party to the present
Convention, the Powers who are parties thereto shall remain bound by it in their mutual
relations. They shall furthermore be bound by the Convention in relation to the said Power, if
the latter accepts and applies the provisions thereof.").
61. ICRC, Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949-United States of America Reservation
/ Declaration Text, http://www.icrc.org/IHL.nsf/NORM/D6B53F5B5D14F35AC1256402003F9
920?OpenDocument (last visited Oct. 10, 2006).
62. 3 COMMENTARY ON THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF 12 AUGUST 1949, at 22 (Jean de
Preux ed., 1960) (emphasis added) (quoting FEDERAL POLITICAL DEPARTMENT, BERNE, 2-A
FINAL RECORD OF THE DIPLOMATIC CONFERENCE OF GENEVA OF 1949, at 108 (William S. Hein &
Co. 2005)).
63. Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, art.
4, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 3520 [hereinafter Fourth Convention] (protecting civilians
1109
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defines "civilians" far more broadly than POWs under the Third Convention. 64 The
Conventions generally afford "a robust rights regime for all war detainees," including
civilians.65 Among the rights granted to civilians are "due process rights... ; the right
to humane treatment; freedom from coercive interrogation; freedom from
discrimination; ... and the prohibition on attacks directed against civilian objects. 66
As with the Third Convention, the Fourth Convention only applies to citizens of those
parties who signed and ratified it.
67
While the Fourth Convention may purport to apply broadly, commentators disagree
on the application of civilian protections to unlawful combatants.68 While some agree
with the United States' position that civilian protections apply only to those not taking
any part in combat, human rights organizations such as the ICRC disagree
vehemently. 9 A plain reading of the Fourth Convention supports the ICRC view. The
provisions define civilians as "[p]ersons protected by the Convention are those who, at
a given moment and in any manner whatsoever, find themselves, in case of a conflict or
occupation, in the hands of a Party to the conflict or Occupying Power of which they
are not nationals." 70 Where the Third Convention, among others, contains detailed
definitions of POWs, combatants, and other protected categories, the Fourth
during wartime while in the hands of a "Party to the conflict" or during any occupation by a
foreign "Occupying Power").
64. Id., art. 4, 6 U.S.T. at 3520 ("Persons protected by the Convention are those who, at a
given moment and in any manner whatsoever, find themselves, in case of a conflict or
occupation, in the hands of a Party to the conflict or Occupying Power of which they are not
nationals.").
65. Derek Jinks, The Declining Significance of POWStatus, 45 HARv. INT'L L.J. 367,374,
378 (2004) (discussing whether the Conventions' POW protections apply to detainees at
Guantanamo Bay).
66. Id.at380-81.
67. Id. ("[N]ationals of a state 'not bound by the Convention are not protected by it."')
(quoting Fourth Convention, supra note 63, art. 4, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 3520). Common Article 3
protections still apply. See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
68. Compare id. at 381-86 (arguing that the Fourth Convention civilian protections "apply
to all enemy nationals-including unlawful combatants-not protected by other Conventions")
with KARMA NABULSi, TRADmoNS OF WAR: OCCUPATION, RESISTANCE, AND THE LAW 241 (1999)
("By the end of the Geneva negotiations in 1949, significant progress had been made in the
codification of the laws of war.... However, the question of the distinction between lawful and
unlawful combatants remained essentially unresolved."); Frits Kalshoven, The Position of
Guerrilla Fighters under the Law of War, 11 REVUE DE DROIT PENAL MILTAIRE ET DE DROIT DE
LA GUERRE 55, 70-71 (1972) (arguing that Geneva Convention drafters did not consider any
combatants not included under the Third Convention when drafting the Fourth Convention).
69. ICRC, International Humanitarian Law and Terrorism: Questions and Answers (2004),
http://www.icrc.org/Web/eng/siteeng0.nsf/html/5YNLEV ("Civilians detained for security
reasons must be accorded the protections provided for in the Fourth Geneva Convention.
Combatants who do not fulfil[l] the requisite criteria for POW status (who, for example, do not
carry arms openly) or civilians who have taken a direct part in hostilities in an international
armed conflict (so-called 'unprivileged' or 'unlawful' belligerents) are protected by the Fourth
Geneva Convention provided they are enemy nationals."); see also George Aldrich, The
Taliban, Al Qaeda, and the Determination of Illegal Combatants, 96 AM. J. INT'L L. 891, 893
(2002); Knut D~rrmann, The Legal Situation of "Unlawful/Unprivileged Combatants, " 85 INT'L
REV. RED CRoss 45 (2003).
70. Fourth Convention, supra note 63, art. 4.
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Convention uses only a broad definition. This expansive view of civilians suggests that
the Fourth Convention's drafters intended its provisions to serve as an encompassing
provision. 71 International war crimes tribunals have followed this broad interpretation
as well. In Prosecutor v. Delalic,72 the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former
Yugoslavia (ICTY) held that "[i]f an individual is not entitled to the protections of the
Third Convention as a prisoner of war (or of the First or Second Conventions) he or
she necessarily falls within the ambit of Convention IV, provided that its article 4
requirements are satisfied.,
73
However, not all commentators agree with this interpretation. Using virtually the
same texts to support the contrary position-that civilian protections apply only to
noncombatants-this side argues that the Conventions do not contain any all-
encompassing clauses. Under this contrary view to the Delalic decision, unlawful
combatants would not "necessarily fall" within the Fourth Convention's protections.
74
This alternate view rejects the implicit inclusion of unlawful combatants in the
definition of civilians, and focuses more carefully on the Article 4 requirements noted
by the ICTY in Delalic. Since other articles that define protected classes do so in
careful detail, only detailed, explicit definitions could cover unlawful combatants.
While drafters may have rejected amendments that explicitly defined unlawful
combatant protections in lieu of a more general, consensus definition, the drafting
history also lends support to the position that unlawful combatants do not qualify for
Fourth Convention protection. The final record suggests that "although the [Third and
Fourth] conventions might appear to cover all the categories concerned, irregular
belligerents were not actually protected., 75 Even the text of Protocol I, cited by
commentators supporting civilian protections for unlawful combatants,76 discusses
minimum procedural protections for those who neither qualify for POW status nor are
entitled to "more favourable treatment in accordance with the Fourth Convention., 77 If
Protocol I and the Fourth Convention meant to place unlawful combatants under
civilian protections, the specific minimum protections would have been unnecessary.
71. See Jinks, Declining Significance, supra note 65, at 384-85. Professor Jinks arrives at
this conclusion by examining both the final text and the Plenary's decision to reject proposed
amendments that would have excluded unlawful combatants.
72. Case No. IT-96-21-T, Judgment (Nov. 16, 1998).
73. Id. 271.
74. S. EXEC. Doc. No. 84-9, at 2 (1955) (The "[Fourth] Convention was drawn up at the
Geneva Convention in 1949, which spells out to a degree never before attempted the obligations
of the parties to furnish humanitarian treatment to two broad categories of civilians: enemy
aliens present within the home territory of a belligerent, and civilian persons found in territory
which it occupies in the course of military operations.").
75. FEDERAL POLITICAL DEPARTMENT, BERNE, 2-A FINAL RECORD OF THE DIPLOMATIC
CONFERENCE OF GENEVA OF 1949, at 622 (William S. Hein & Co. 2005).
76. See Jinks, Declining Significance, supra note 65, at 384-85 ("The relevant provisions
of Additional Protocol I involve two conceptually distinct reforms: (1) these provisions relaxed
the requirements for lawful combatant and POW status; and (2) they clarified the protective
consequences of failing to meet these relaxed requirements.").
77. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the
Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), art. 45, June 8, 1977, 1125
U.N.T.S. 3, 24 [hereinafter Protocol I].
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The Fourth Convention's "derogation" provision in Article 5 also supports the
separate classification of unlawful combatants. Under this provision, a party may
detain enemy combatants-lawful or otherwise-indefinitely for security reasons,
subject to a few critical limitations: 78
Where, in the territory of a Party to the conflict, the latter is satisfied that an
individual protected person is definitely suspected of or engaged in activities
hostile to the security of the State, such individual person shall not be entitled to
claim such rights and privileges under the present Convention as would, if
exercised in the favour of such individual person, be prejudicial to the security of
such State.
Where in occupied territory an individual protected person is detained as a spy
or saboteur, or as a person under definite suspicion of activity hostile to the
security of the Occupying Power, such person shall, in those cases where absolute
military security so requires, be regarded as having forfeited rights of
communication under the present Convention.
In each case, such persons shall nevertheless be treated with humanity, and in
case of trial, shall not be deprived of the rights of fair and regular trial prescribed
by the present Convention. They shall also be granted the full rights and privileges
of a protected person under the present Convention at the earliest date consistent
with the security of the State or Occupying Power, as the case may be.79
The text appears to limit detention to those combatants "in the territory of a Party to
the conflict [or] ... in occupied territory."80 Article 5 only applies when the detaining
party has "good reason to suspect that a particular individual has engaged in hostile
acts. 8s Most detainees will meet this standard, since the text considers only the good
faith belief of the detaining party. The derogation article also provides an upper limit
on the length of the detention, limiting it to "the earliest date consistent with the
security" of the detaining party.8 2 As with the "good reason" provision, the Fourth
Convention's limitation on detention realistically applies almost no barrier to the
indefinite detention of terror suspects or combatants. Even the last paragraph's
requirement that detaining parties treat prisoners with humanity and grant them a "fair
and regular trial" provides little specific guidance, other than preventing the detaining
party from suspending the right to a fair trial (even in the face of security concerns that
authorize further detention).
In 1949, the Conventions' drafters likely did not anticipate the rise decades later of
asymmetric warfare and terrorism. As a result, the Conventions' categorizations do not
apply neatly to terror suspects such as Hamdan. However, arguments for Fourth
Convention protection of unlawful combatants fail to explain why combatants engaged
in sustained combat or asymmetric terrorist acts should receive identical, or virtually
78. Fourth Convention, supra note 63, art. 5.
79. Id.
80. Id.; see also Jinks, Declining Significance, supra note 65, at 388.
81. Jinks, Declining Significance, supra note 65, at 389; see also Fourth Convention, supra
note 63, art. 5.
82. Fourth Convention, supra note 63, art. 5; see also Jinks, Declining Significance, supra
note 65, at 390.
1112 [Vol. 82:1101
2007] CRAFTING MILITARY COMMISSIONS POST-HAMDAN
identical, protections as innocent noncombatants do when detained incident to
occupation or combat.
While not addressing terrorists or unlawful combatants directly, other articles in the
Conventions provide further support for classifying Al Qaeda members or other
belligerents as combatants rather than civilians. The Conventions prohibit the
intentional, reckless, or even negligent killing of civilians, 83 but other articles provide
combatants the authority to kill their adversaries. 84 Classifying captured Al Qaeda and
other unlawful combatants as civilians creates a conflict between these provisions. If
unlawful combatants qualified as civilians under the Fourth Convention, then United
States forces would have violated the Conventions by intentionally targeting and killing
these "civilians."
The United States properly classified Al Qaeda members as "unlawful combatants"
because they "lack some or all of the four attributes specified in Article 4 [of the Third
Convention]. 85 Specifically, while Al Qaeda members and other detainees qualify as
"[m]embers of other militias . .. [or] organized resistance movements," 86 these
belligerents do not meet the conditions outlined by Article 4, Section 2. To qualify for
protection, combatants must "fulfill the following conditions: (a) that of being
commanded by a person responsible for his subordinates; (b) that of having a fixed
distinctive sign recognizable at a distance; (c) that of carrying arms openly; (d) that of
conducting their operations in accordance with the laws and customs of war."8 7 With
the possible exception of the command structure provision in (a), Al Qaeda and other
similar combatants have failed to wear any insignia or uniform distinguishing them
from the civilian population, have used hidden bomb vests in bombings, and
deliberately targeted civilians-all violations of the Conventions.
Precisely because the law of war draws a distinction between noncombatants and
combatants on the battlefield, noncombatants may not take up arms against forces that
respect their complete immunity.88 Classifying unlawful combatants such as Al Qaeda
83. E.g., Commentary to Protocol I, at 615 (Yves Sandoz, Christophe Swinarski & Bruno
Zimmerman eds., 1977) (stating that the Geneva and Hague Conventions, and their Additional
Protocols "explicitly confirm[ed] the customary rule that innocent civilians must be kept outside
hostilities as far as possible and enjoy general protection against danger arising from
hostilities"); 4 COMMENTARY, supra note 47, at 3 (it is a "cardinal principle of the law of war...
that the civilian population must enjoy complete immunity").
84. E.g., MICHAEL BoTHE, KARL JOSEF PARTSCH & WALDEMAR A. SOLF, NEW RULES FOR
VICTIMS OF ARMED CONFLICTS: COMMENTARY ON THE TwO 1977 PROTOCOLS ADDITIONAL TO THE
GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF 1949, at 243 (1982) ("[Combatant] privilege provides immunity from
the application of municipal law prohibitions against homicides[,] wounding and maiming, or
capturing persons and destruction of property, so long as these acts are done as acts of war and
do not transgress the restraints of the rules of international law applicable in armed conflict.").
85. INT'L AND OPERATIONAL LAW DEP'T, JUDGE ADVOCATE GENS. LEGAL CTR. AND SCH.,
OPERATIONAL LAW HANDBOOK 418 (MAJ John Rawcliffe & CPT Jeannine Smith eds., 2006).
86. Third Convention, supra note 41, art. 4.
87. Id.
88. See BOTHE, PARTSCH & SOLF, supra note 84, at 243-44 ("Civilians who participate
directly in hostilities, as well as spies and members of the armed forces who forfeit their
combatant status, do not enjoy that privilege, and may be tried, under appropriate safeguards, for
direct participation in hostilities as well as for any crime under municipal law which they might
have committed.") (citation omitted).
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members as civilians encourages all combatants-lawful and unlawful alike-to take
advantage of parties that comply with the Conventions. Arguably, some combatants
already do this. Numerous groups in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, in Iraq, and
elsewhere use mosques, churches, U.N. missions and posts, and other protected areas
as fortresses or operations bases almost certainly because parties targeting those areas
directly would violate the Conventions. Allowing civilians and unlawful combatants to
participate directly in hostilities without fear of prosecution or lack of protection under
the Conventions would make distinguishing between combatants and noncombatants
considerably more difficult, and encourage parties to ignore the laws ofwar in favor of
achieving military objectives.8 9 With the Military Commissions Act of 2006, Congress
made the debate over unlawful enemy combatant classification purely academic under
United States law.90
IV. A BRIEF LOOK AT MILITARY COMMISSIONS PRE-HAMDAN
Article 5 of the Third Convention provides procedures for determining whether a
particular individual or group belongs to any of the protected categories of combatants
or noncombatants. The Conventions specifically authorize parties to make this decision
by using a tribunal: "Should any doubt arise as to whether persons... belong to any of
the categories enumerated in Article 4, such persons shall enjoy the protection of the
present Convention until such time as their status has been determined by a competent
tribunal." 91
Army Regulation 190-8, a joint regulation with all branches of the United States
armed forces, outlines the procedures for the "competent tribunal" described in the
Third Convention.92 The tribunal, commonly referred to as an AR 190 tribunal,
consists of three commissioned officers.93 AR 190 provides procedures for the oath,94
the tribunal record,95 and witness testimony,96 specifies the burden of proof,97 and
outlines the rights to an interpreter," to an open hearing,99 to the detainee's
presence, 00 and a detainee's right to testify1"' (or not).' 0 2 An AR 190 tribunal
89. See Richard R. Baxter, So-called "UnprivilegedBelligerency": Spies, Guerrillas, and
Saboteurs, 28 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 323, 343 (1951).
90. This Note discusses Congress' refined definition infra Part V.
91. Third Convention, supra note 41, art. 5.
92. Dep't of the Army, Army Regulation 190-8 Enemy Prisoners of War, Retained
Personnel, Civilian Internees and Other Detainees, (1997) http://www.usapa.army.mil/
pdffiles/rl90_8.pdf [hereinafter AR 190].
93. Id. § 1-6(c). Interestingly, the only other requirement specified by AR 190 is that at
least one officer must be a "field grade" officer (an officer above the rank of captain). None of
the members of the tribunal needs any specific legal or judicial training. Id.
94. Id. § 1-6(e)(1).
95. Id. § 1-6(e)(2).
96. Id. § 1-6(e)(6). The detainee may "call witnesses if reasonably available." Id.
97. Id. § 1-6(e)(9) ("Preponderance of the evidence shall be the standard.").
98. Id. § 1-6(e)(5) ("Persons whose status is to be determined ... will be provided an
interpreter if necessary.").
99. Id. § 1-6(e)(3) ("Proceedings shall be open except for deliberation and voting ....
100. Id. § 1-6(e)(5) ("Persons whose status is to be determined shall be allowed to
attend .... ).
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categorizes a detainee as a member of one of four groups: an Enemy Prisoner of War
(EPW in the regulation); a Recommended Retained Personnel (RP in the regulation)
"entitled to EPW protections, who should be considered for certification as a medical,
religious, or volunteer aid society RP"; a Civilian Internee "who for reasons of
operational security, or probable cause incident to criminal investigation, should be
detained"; or an innocent civilian "who should be immediately returned to his home or
released."'
10 3
The Department of Defense's Commission Order No. 1, however, described a
different procedure. The Order established separate military tribunals to try noncitizen
detainees' °4 for violations of the laws of war and other laws.' 0 5 The Order covers a
wide range of potential detainees, provided
(1) there is reason to believe that such individual, at the relevant times,
(i) is or was a member of the organization known as al Qaida;
(ii) has engaged in, aided or abetted, or conspired to commit, acts of
international terrorism, or acts in preparation therefor, that have caused,
threaten to cause, or have as their aim to cause, injury to or adverse
effects on the United States, its citizens, national security, foreign
policy, or economy; or
(iii) has knowingly harbored one or more individuals described [in earlier
sections] .... 106
Although not specified in the Order, the Department of Defense also relied on the
intelligence value of a detainee to determine the detainee's status.'07 This initial order's
broad definition of covered individuals required no finding of fact and consequently
precluded any significant discussion of whether the detainee was eligible for trial by
the tribunal in the first place.'0 8 In most other aspects, though, the Combatant Status
101. Id. § 1-6(e)(7).
102. Id. § 1-6(e)(8).
103. Id. § 1-6(e)(10). The list of categories available to the tribunal does not include a
category for unlawful combatants, arguably providing support for critics that support
categorization of unlawful combatants as civilians.
104. Hamdan was a citizen and much of the debate in his case focused on his detention as a
citizen. In contrast, Bush's Military Order specifically stated "[t]he term 'individual subject to
this order' shall mean any individual who is not a United States citizen." Detention, Treatment,
and Trial of Certain Non-Citizens in the War Against Terrorism, 66 Fed. Reg. 57,833, 57,834.
(Nov. 16, 2001).
105. Id. at 57,833.
106. Id. at 57,834.
107. Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Def., Transfer of Five Moroccan Detainees Completed
(Aug. 2, 2004), http://www.defenselink.mil/Releases/Release.aspx?ReleaseID=7598 ("The
decision to transfer or release a detainee is based on many factors, including whether the
detainee is offurther intelligence value to the United States and whether he is believed to pose a
continued threat to the United States if released.") (emphasis added).
108. The Court's decisions in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 509-12 (2004), and
Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426,430-32 (2004), however, narrowed this definition-at least
when applied to citizens. These cases required the United States to undertake a significant fact-




Review Tribunal established by a subsequent order' °9 followed AR 190. The
similarities were unsurprising, both since the government had well-established
procedures in AR 190, and since the Court in Hamdi referred favorably to that existing
regulation." 0 As discussed above in Part I, the Court rejected these tribunals largely
because Congress had not expressly authorized them."'
V. HA MA N'S SAFE HARBOR AND THE MILITARY COMMISSIoNs ACT OF 2006
A. Hamdan's Safe Harbor: Justice Kennedy's Concurrence
The majority's opinion in Hamdan struck down the military commissions
established by Commission Order No. 1 and subsequent orders. However, as in Hamdi
when the Court referred to AR 190 approvingly, 1 2 the Court in Hamdan provided
Congress and the President with a road map to a constitutionally sound tribunal. The
plurality in Justice Stevens's opinion discusses the issues in this section generally and
notes agreement with Justice Kennedy's concurrence in several places. Justice
Kennedy, however, explains in detail the "safe harbor" available to the President and
Congress in his concurrence. Satisfying Justice Kennedy's concerns would likely tip
the balance of the Court toward approval of the Military Commissions Act.
Accordingly, much of this Note's Part V draws from Justice Kennedy's concurring
opinion.
The Court (and Justice Kennedy's concurrence in particular) suggested acceptable
types of military commissions by outlining differences between the military
commissions created by Commission Order No. 1 and those permitted by the UCMJ.
Specifically, the Court focused on procedures and oversight mechanisms that applied
to courts-martial but were missing from the tribunals at issue in the case. Justice
Kennedy specifically highlighted the "several noteworthy departures" in the power
granted to the Appointing Authority in the military commissions. 113
The UCMJ requires not only that a presiding officer be "a member of a state or
federal bar and [be] specially certified for judicial duties by the Judge Advocate
General for the officer's Armed Service," but also requires that he or she be "directly
109. See Memorandum from the Dep't of Def. to the Secretary of the Navy, Order
Establishing Combatant Status Review Tribunal (July 7, 2004), http://www.defenselink.mil/
news/Jul2004/d20040707review.pdf.
110. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 538 ("There remains the possibility that the standards we have
articulated could be met by an appropriately authorized and properly constituted military
tribunal. Indeed, it is notable that military regulations already provide for such process in related
instances, dictating that tribunals be made available to determine the status of enemy detainees
who assert prisoner-of-war status under the Geneva Convention.").
11. See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749, 2799 (2006) ("The Court's conclusion
ultimately rests upon a single ground: Congress has not issued the Executive a 'blank check.'
Indeed, Congress has denied the President the legislative authority to create military
commissions of the kind at issue here. Nothing prevents the President from returning to
Congress to seek the authority he believes necessary.") (Breyer, J., concurring) (internal citation
omitted).
112. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 538.
113. Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2805-06 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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responsible to the Judge Advocate General or the Judge Advocate General's
designee."'1"4 The Court in Weiss v. United States held that placing presiding officers
"under the authority of the appropriate Judge Advocate General rather than under the
authority of the convening officer" protected a court-martial's independence and
supported due process."l5
Unlike courts-martial, the presiding officer and commission members in the
tribunals at issue in Hamdan had little insulation from control by the Defense
Department's political appointees." 6 The Appointing Authority determined the size
and makeup of the commissions, directed the chief prosecutor, adjudicated plea
agreements, handled media contact, and even provided discretionary investigative
assistance to the defense "insofar as he or she 'deem[ed] necessary for a full and fair
trial.""'1 7 This overarching control threatened the important judicial independence
emphasized by the Court in Weiss. In contrast to the Court's guidance in that case, the
Order placed the commission's presiding officers and prosecutors under the direct
control of Department of Defense stakeholders.
The military tribunals and regular courts-martial differed in other fundamental
aspects as well. The Rules for Courts-Martial adhere to a strict separation between the
convening authority and appellate authorities. For example, the Court of Criminal
Appeals, Courts of Military Review, and the Court of Military Appeals function
separately from the convening authority. Either the President, with the advice and
consent of the Senate, or a Judge Advocate General select and appoint judges to these
military courts." 8 Contrast this approach with the one used in the Hamdan tribunal,
where, for example, the Appointing Authority (and not a military appeals court)
decided dispositive interlocutory issues and accepted or rejected plea agreements." 9
The military tribunals in Hamdan failed because the Appointing Authority's
extraordinary supervisory powers compromised the trial process. The commission
structure left a single authority with a stake in the outcome controlling virtually every
key aspect of the process. Justice Kennedy believed that this derivation from courts-
martial procedures could "affect the deliberative process and the prosecution's burden
of persuasion" and "raise concerns that the commission's decisionmaking may not be
neutral."1
20
The Court also criticized the tribunals' standards governing the admission of
evidence. Both Justice Kennedy's concurrence and the majority noted the Order's
departure from the rules that govem courts-martial. The UCMJ permits significant
flexibility for the admissibility of evidence in courts-martial. For example, Article 49
permits the introduction of depositions from absent or unavailable witnesses.'12 The
114. Id. at 2806 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (citing MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, UNITED
STATES, R. FOR COURTS-MARTIAL 502(c) (2005)).
115. 510 U.S. 163, 180 (1994).
116. Justice Stevens notes that the Secretary of Defense had appointed "John D. Altenberg,
Jr., a retired Army major general and longtime military lawyer [as] 'Appointing Authority for
Military Commissions."' Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2760 (Stevens, J., concurring).
117. Id. at 2805 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (internal citations omitted).
118. Weiss, 510 U.S. at 168-69.
119. Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2805-06 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
120. Id. at 2806-07 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
121. 10 U.S.C. § 849(d) (2000), amended by 10 U.S.C.S. § 849(d) (LexisNexis Supp. 2006)
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Military Rules of Evidence in courts-martial permit military courts to redact "classified
information from documents made available to the accused," provide summaries or
substitutes, or even withhold disclosure entirely in the interests of national security. 122
Justice Kennedy explained further that Commission Order No. 1 "abandon[ed] the
detailed Military Rules of Evidence" modeled after the Federal Rules of Evidence in
favor of a single rule: "'Evidence shall be admitted if ... the evidence would have
probative value to a reasonable person."" 23 This "reasonable probative value" rule
encouraged the admission of any statement, regardless of its reliability. 24 Conceivably,
the military commissions could have admitted several types of statements prohibited
under the UCMJ or the Military Rules of Evidence: those obtained through coercion, 125
hearsay, 26 the product of multiple levels of hearsay, 127 or unsworn depositions. 2 8 Even
if the presiding officer found evidence inadmissible, military commission members-
unlike those appointed to a court-martial--could override the decision by majority vote
or simply view the material anyway.
29
Rejecting the sole justification of "the danger posed by international terrorism," the
majority opinion found "no suggestion, for example, of any logistical difficulty in
securing properly sworn and authenticated evidence or in applying the usual principles
of relevance and admissibility."' 30 The majority left open the converse proposition. If
the administration offers evidence that courts-martial procedures reach the standard of
impracticability required, even otherwise highly flawed commissions could secure the
Court's approval.
The Court also left open two other important avenues. As explained in Part III
above, the administration still could detain prisoners for the duration of hostilities in
accordance with the Geneva Conventions.' 3' Although the Conventions provide
prisoners detained under these circumstances with certain rights that may create other
issues with detainee treatment, the Conventions would not require the administration to
provide a civil trial or military tribunal beyond a possible Article V adjudication.
Justice Kennedy urged the government to choose a second potential option in his
concurrence. With the Court's decision that the military commissions were
unauthorized, Kennedy reminded the government that Congress on its own initiative or
(permitting an otherwise admissible deposition to be admitted if the witness resides more than
100 miles from the jurisdiction where the board sits, if the witness cannot reasonably appear, or
if the witness's whereabouts are unknown).
122. MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, UNITED STATES, R. FOR COURTS-MARTIAL 505 (2005).
123. Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2807-08 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (omission in original).
124. See id. at 2808 (noting that the broad admissibility rule "could permit admission of
multiple hearsay and other forms of evidence generally prohibited on grounds of unreliability").
125. 10 U.S.C. § 831(d) (2000).
126. MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, UNITED STATES, R. FOR COURTS-MARTIAL 802 (2005).
127. See id. at R. 805.
128. See 10 U.S.C. § 849 (2000).
129. See Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2808 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
130. Id. at 2792. In his concurrence, Justice Kennedy agreed "the Government [had] made
no demonstration of practical need for these special rules and procedures, either in this
particular case or as to the military commissions in general, nor is any such need self-evident."
Id. at 2808 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (internal citation omitted).
131. See supra note 78 and accompanying text.
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at the direction of the administration could still "choose to provide further guidance in
this area.',
132
B. Applying Hamdan to the Military Commissions Act of 2006
Following the Court's decision in Hamdan, Congress did revise the tribunal process
with the Military Commissions Act of 2006 (MCA) only months later. On September
27, 2006, the House of Representatives passed the MCA. 133 On the next day, the
Senate passed a nearly identical version,' 34 which the House then approved on
September 29.135 President Bush signed the MCA into law on October 17, 2006.136
The MCA molds a new military tribunal regime based on Justice Kennedy's
concurrence and safe harbor in Hamdan. The bill amends Title 10 of the United States
Code, adding a new Chapter 47A with seven subchapters, providing explicit
authorization for new military commissions not based on the UCMJ, limiting the
enforceability of the Geneva Conventions to illegal enemy combatants, and eliminating
most judicial review for alien detainees.' 37
Subchapter I (General Provisions) of Chapter 47A clarifies Common Article 3's
ambiguity concerning unlawful and lawful enemy combatants. Section 948a(l) of the
new law defines "unlawful enemy combatant" as:
(i) a person who has engaged in hostilities or who has purposefully and
materially supported hostilities against the United States or its co-belligerents
who is not a lawful enemy combatant (including a person who is part of the
Taliban, al Qaeda, or associated forces); or
(ii) a person who, before, on, or after the date of the enactment of the Military
Commissions Act of 2006, has been determined to be an unlawful enemy
combatant by a Combatant Status Review Tribunal or another competent
tribunal established under the authority of the President or the Secretary of
Defense. 
38
132. Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2809 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
133. H.R. 6166, 109th Cong. (2006).
134. S. Res. 3930, 109th Cong. (2006) (enacted).
135. Id. The original version of the Senate bill differed in one respect from the one ultimately
passed by both houses and signed into law. The original version contained a list of "Findings"
ostensibly to build a stronger case of congressional authorization for the Court, but also to assert
authority in the battle over war powers. The Findings did not appear in either the House version
or the final law, but asserted congressional supremacy over military commissions. While noting
that the President and military commanders had convened military commissions in the past, the
original Senate bill's Section Two stated that "[i]t is in the national interestfor Congress to
exercise its authority under the Constitution to enact legislation" authorizing military
commissions. S. Res. 3930, § 2 (enacted) (emphasis added), available at http://thomas.loc.gov/
as "S.3930.ES."
136. Press Release, Office of the Press Sec'y of the President, President Bush Signs Military
Commissions Act of 2006 (Oct. 17, 2006), http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/
2006/10/20061017-1 .html.




Section 948a(2) defines "lawful enemy combatants" as:
(A) a member of the regular forces of a State party engaged in hostilities against
the United States;
(B) a member of a militia, volunteer corps, or organized resistance movement
belonging to a State party engaged in such hostilities, which are under
responsible command, wear a fixed distinctive sign recognizable at a
distance, carry their arms openly, and abide by the law of war; or
(C) a member of a regular armed force who professes allegiance to a government
engaged in such hostilities, but not recognized by the United States. 139
Therefore, the new Subchapter I makes clear the difference between regular armed
forces, as traditionally understood by-but not defined precisely in-the Geneva
Conventions, and any terrorist or other irregular armed force. Congress's definition
fills a significant hole and substantially clarifies the debate over classification as it
applies to military commissions in the United States. 140 By separating lawful and
unlawful enemy combatants, Congress expressly recognizes a previously unstated
category of belligerent that does not fit any conventional definition and should be
treated differently by the law.
Congress's new definitions also serve to limit the courts' jurisdiction over illegal
enemy combatants, especially noncitizens. The definition of "illegal enemy combatant"
includes not just those engaged in hostilities, but also those who have "purposefully
and materially supported hostilities.'' Under the broadest definition, the United
States could detain individuals who provide financial or other material support to
hostilities-perhaps including clerics and others that incite violence through speeches
or writings-as illegal enemy combatants. The second portion of the definition
retroactively includes any detainees judged unlawful enemy combatants by an Article
V tribunal. 1
42
The definition of "illegal enemy combatant" in the MCA includes both citizens and
noncitizens. The Court in Hamdi found "no bar to [the United States'] holding one of
its own citizens as an enemy combatant,"' 143 but the majority required that detained
citizens receive the opportunity to challenge an enemy combatant designation. 144 To




140. Unfortunately, Congress's new definition likely does not resolve the classification
debate in international courts and tribunals. Debates over customary international law, the
application of Additional Protocols I and II of the Geneva Conventions, the definition of
"unlawful combatants," and the nature of the War on Terror will continue at least until a new
protocol or convention clearly defines the status of terrorist groups such as Al Qaeda.
141. S. Res. 3930 § 3(a)(1) (enacted).
142. Id.
143. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 519 (2004).
144. Id. at 533 ("[A] citizen-detainee seeking to challenge his classification as an enemy
combatant must receive notice of the factual basis for his classification, and a fair opportunity to
rebut the Government's factual assertions before a neutral decisionmaker.").
145. See S. Res. 3930 § 3(a)(l) (enacted). The bill's new 10 U.S.C. § 948d(a) provides the
Act's military commissions "jurisdiction to try any offense made punishable by this chapter or
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The MCA does not afford non-citizen detainees the same right to challenge
adjudications. Section 950j in the Act strips courts of jurisdiction over any cause of
action, including habeas corpus petitions, related "to the prosecution, trial, orjudgment
of a military commission... including challenges to the lawfulness of procedures of
military commissions.' 46 The Act applies retroactively to "any action pending on or
filed after the date of enactment"'147 and allows only a limited review by the Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia and the Supreme Court. Section 950g limits
appeals to matters of law with a primary focus on whether a commission's "standards
and procedures" were consistent with the Act.las
The Act places a further limit on causes of action by preventing alien unlawful
enemy combatants from invoking "the Geneva Conventions as a source of rights.'
149
For reasons discussed in Part III, the MCA's denial of Geneva Conventions'
protections for unlawful enemy combatants merely reaffirms the status of combatants
envisioned by Convention drafters. The MCA carefully avoids removing Geneva
Conventions' protection from lawful combatants or citizens and the removal of
protection applies only to alien unlawful enemy combatants. This clarification
represents the further guidance that Justice Kennedy, in his Hamdan concurrence,
urged Congress to provide.
However, the Court's decision in Hamdi casts doubt on the constitutionality of this
provision. The Court would likely strike the limited scope of review and specific
removal of habeas corpus as unconstitutional. A plurality of the Court in Hamdi noted
that absent suspension, the writ of habeas corpus is available to all enemy combatants
detained in the United States regardless of their citizenship.' 50 Justice Kennedy, the key
vote in Hamdan, was a member of the Hamdi plurality. If the Court splits along the
same lines as in Hamdan on habeas corpus petitions for non-citizen detainees, the
provisions described above would certainly violate constitutional protections.
Subchapter I of the MCA continues by addressing one of the Court's primary
contentions in Hamdan. The subchapter's definitions specifically exempt the military
commissions from some requirements of courts-martial. Although "[t]he procedures for
military commissions set forth in [the new Act] are based upon the procedures for trial
by general courts-martial," the latter procedures do not "apply to trial by military
commission except as specifically provided in [the MCA]." 5 ' In other words, "[t]he
judicial construction and application of [the general courts-martial statute] are not
the law of war when committed by an alien unlawful enemy combatant."
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id. The new § 950g purports to allow the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
and the Supreme Court to consider "to the extent applicable, the Constitution and the laws of the
United States" in any appeal. Id.
149. Id.
150. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 525 (2004). The plurality reluctantly adopted the
definition of "enemy combatants" proffered by the government: individuals who were "part of
or supporting forces hostile to the United States or coalition partners in Afghanistan and who
engaged in an armed conflict against the United States there." Id. at 516 (quoting Brief for the
Respondents at 3, Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004) (No. 03-6696)). Despite the
definition, the plurality of Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, and Breyer and Chief Justice Rehnquist
chose to limit their opinion to the "narrow question" of "the detention of citizens falling within
that definition [of enemy combatants]." Id.
151. S. Res. 3930 § 3(a)(1) (enacted).
INDIANA LAWJOURNAL
binding on military commissions established under [the MCA]."' 52 MCA Section
948b(e) further segregates military commissions from regular courts-martial. The
section prohibits the government from introducing or considering "findings, holdings,
interpretations, and other precedents of military commissions" in courts-martial. 5 3 Not
only does the MCA create a separate military commission regime, it also attempts to
ensure that the commissions will have no precedential effect on other military courts or
tribunals.
The attempt to separate the MCA tribunals from courts-martial reappears later in
the Act in revisions to the UCMJ itself. In Hamdan, Justice Kennedy-joined by
Justices Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer-held that, through 10 U.S.C. § 821,
"Congress require[d] that military commissions like the ones at issue conform to
the 'law of war."" 54 Section 4 of the Act amends the UCMJ by excluding the new
military commissions from the conformity requirements used by the Court in
Hamdan to incorporate the Geneva Conventions into the UCMJ.155 Section 4 of
the MCA also amends section 836 of the UMCJ to address the practicability and
uniformity concerns raised by the Court in Hamdan.156 The Act removes the duty
that the new commissions be prescribed by the President by regulations which
shall, so far as he considers practicable, apply the principles of law and the rules of
evidence generally recognized in the trial of criminal cases in the United States
district courts, but which may not be contrary to or inconsistent with this
chapter.
57
Section 4 of the MCA also eliminates the UCMJ's requirement in section 836 for
uniformity in rules and regulations. 158 In both cases, the MCA adds language
exempting military commissions established by the MCA from these requirements. 59
The elimination of the practicability and uniformity requirements removes two critical
supporting sections in the Court's decision in Hamdan. Under the MCA, the Court can
no longer make determinations about the adequacy of the procedures of the military
commissions. This forced separation may reach too far. The Hamdan Court objected to
the marked differences between the original military commissions and statutory and
international requirements. 160 The MCA does not attempt to address those concerns.
The Court in Hamdan expressed differing views on the standard of a "regularly
constituted" court under the UCMJ (and, by extension, Common Article 3). 161 Whether
the MCA's decidedly irregular tribunal meets the standard is unclear. The plurality did
not address the point directly, and Justice Alito's dissent urged the Court to adopt a
narrow standard. He argued that "the term 'regularly' is synonymous with 'properly'
and that a properly constituted tribunal is one "properly appointed, set up, or
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749,2799 (2006) (quoting 10 U.S.C. § 821 (2000)).
155. See S. Res. 3930 § 4(a)(2) (amending 10 U.S.C. §§ 821, 828, 848, 850, 905, 906).
156. See id. § 4(a)(3)(A)-(B).
157. 10 U.S.C. § 836(a) (2000).
158. See S. Res. 3930 § 4(a)(3)(B) (enacted).
159. Id. § 4(a)(3) (enacted).
160. See supra Part V.A and text accompanying notes 29-41.
161. See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
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established" under domestic law.162 Justice Kennedy's concurrence, however,
repeatedly referred to fairness concerns: executive branch interference,1 63 uniformity
with the UCMJ,164 tribunal structure and composition,165 the tribunal review process, 1
66
and evidence.' 67 The MCA creates a two-tier standard by treating illegal enemy
combatant aliens far more harshly than it would treat illegal enemy combatant
citizens-a structure the Court would likely find unfair as well.'
68
The MCA does partially address one of Justice Kennedy's concerns: in Subchapter
II, the Act bars the convening authority from "prepar[ing] or review[ing] any report
concerning the effectiveness, fitness, or efficiency of a military judge detailed to the
military commission which relates to his performance of duty as a military judge on the
military commission."' 69 This eliminates some of the potential for executive branch
interference, though the military judge still reports to the convening authority and not
the Judge Advocate General. The "Prohibition on Evaluation of Fitness"' 70 could
prevent certain types of reprisals but would not address the host of structure and
composition issues that Justice Kennedy found troublesome. The Act addresses none of
the other fairness concerns outlined by Justice Kennedy's concurrence.
The Act attempts to address the concern that the separation of military commissions
from the UCMJ and Common Article 3 results in commissions that do not meet the
standard of a "regularly constituted court."' 71 The MCA specifically states that "[a]
military commission established under [the Act] is a regularly constituted court" for
purposes of the UMCJ and Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions. 72 Despite
the MCA's assertion that the new commissions meet the standard of a regularly
constituted court under the UCMJ and Common Article 3, if the definition of
"regularly constituted" includes fairness considerations, the Court will overturn the
Act. If the MCA's decoupling from UCMJ procedures violates the fairness principles
of the UCMJ and Common Article 3 stressed by Justice Kennedy, then the MCA
tribunals cannot constitute "regular" courts. If the Court splits along the same lines as
162. Id. at 2850 (Alito, J., dissenting). Since the Act rejects the Geneva Conventions as a
source of rights, the Court could find that Common Article 3 would not recognize the
commission as a regularly constituted court even under Justice Alito's narrow definition.
163. See id. at 2804 (Kennedy, J., concurring) ("[A]ny suggestion of Executive power to
interfere with an ongoing judicial process raises concerns about the proceeding's fairness.").
164. See id. at 2803 ("The concept of a 'regularly constituted court' providing
'indispensable' judicial guarantees requires consideration of the system ofjustice under which
the commission is established, though no doubt certain minimum standards are applicable.").
165. See id at 2805 (noting that "the structure and composition of the military commission.
*. raise questions about the fairness of the trial").
166. See id. at 2807 ("[Detainees] must navigate a military review process that again raises
fairness concerns.").
167. See id. at 2809 ("This fairness determination [on admission of secret evidence],
moreover, is unambiguously subject to judicial review under the [Detainee Treatment Act].").
168. A finding of unfairness on this point alone may not necessarily doom the structure.
Noncitizens do not enjoy the same level of constitutional protection as citizens do, and the
Court may choose to look beyond the dichotomous structure itself to invalidate the MCA.
169. S. Res. 3930, 109th Congress, § 3(a)(1) (2006) (enacted).
170. Id.
171. See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
172. S. Res. 3930 § 3(a)(1) (enacted).
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Hamdan, Justice Kennedy's definition of a regularly constituted court, and not Justice
Alito's, will likely prevail.
CONCLUSION
Following the September 11 terrorist attacks, the Bush Administration made
fundamental changes to its counterterrorism approach. The Military Commissions Act
of 2006 removes any ambiguity about Congress's commitment to both the War on
Terror and the President's power to pursue terrorists aggressively. The MCA
represents a unique application of both domestic and international laws of war to a
situation that the Geneva Convention drafters likely could not have foreseen in 1949
(or even 1977). The Act sensibly redefines nonsovereign terror groups such as Al
Qaeda-its most significant contribution. However, the rest of the Act represents a
strong statutory rebuke of the Supreme Court's decision in Hamdan.
Congress will not have the last voice on this subject, though. The Court has
traditionally shown reluctance to intervene in wartime, especially when the executive
and legislative branches have joined in a common strategy. 173 However, the MCA does
not adequately balance the standards of fairness and detainee rights with the competing
concerns of national security and war prosecution. In 1998, Chief Justice Rehnquist
wrote that "it is both desirable and likely that more careful attention will be paid by the
courts to the basis for the government's claims of necessity as a basis for curtailing
civil liberty."'174 The MCA tests the boundaries of the Court's traditional deference.
The Court cannot remedy the deficiencies in the Geneva Conventions' treatment of
terrorists, nor completely define the world's approach to the War on Terror. However,
the Court must clearly define the value of civil liberties for the United States' political
branches and the scope of liberty, even for the most reprehensible of terrorists. Under
Justice Kennedy's overarching fairness standard in Hamdan, the MCA clearly needs
improvement and will not withstand inevitable challenges to its validity.
173. E.g., Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U. S. 579,637 (1952) (Jackson, J.,
concurring).
174. WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, ALL THE LAWS BUT ONE: CIVIL LIBERTIES IN WARTIME 225
(1998).
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